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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyse the possible channels through which informality, remittances and 
migration could interact and consequently affect growth in Mexico.  In order to do so, we develop a 
simple endogenous growth model that allows for remittances and the coexistence of the formal and 
informal sector in the production function. In the literature, there is no agreement regarding the 
effects of the informal sector on economic growth. Moreover, thanks to globalization, migration and 
remittances have increased significantly their macroeconomic weight, renewing interest in studying 
the interactions that these variables might have, especially in developing countries like Mexico, 
where remittances are the third source of income after oil and tourism revenues. Our model shows 
that remittances play a crucial role on enhancing the Mexican resource constraint, while the 
possibility of migration in the informal sector drains the aggregate labor force. However, the 
magnitude of potential remittances may offset this loss, thus having an overall positive effect on 
economic growth. 
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A. Introduction 
 
In the past decades, we have witnessed the spread of globalization. Never before, the world 
economy has known the magnitude of flows between countries that we can see today1. Commerce 
has boomed around the world thanks to a wide range of trade agreements, while massive migrations 
attracted by wealth poles are reshaping countries and societies. The outcome, and so the final 
verdict regarding the positive or negative effect of globalization, is still an open question. Some 
economic variables, that in the past seemed to play a marginal role, are now acquiring unexpected 
relevance. Remittances, informality and migration, for example, are increasing their importance in 
many rich and developing countries, although the exact influence that they have on growth is still 
uncertain or at most ambiguous.  
   
In this paper, we deal with the possible interactions that these variables may have among them and 
the ways they could affect economic growth in Mexico. So, we focus on two central questions: 
What is the potential impact of the informal sector on economic growth? and through which 
channels remittances and migration can interact and affect economic development through 
informality? 
   
Empirical evidence on the relationship between informality and economic growth is contradictory. 
On one hand, Helderber and Knepel (1988), Loayza (1997) and Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) 
find a negative relation; on the other hand, Tedds (1998), Giles and Tedds (2002), and more 
recently Chaudhuri et al. (2006) find a positive impact of informality on growth.  
 
In the same way, remittances are believed to have both positive and negative impacts on developing 
countries. De Bruyn and Wets (2006) disaggregate these effects into three levels: macro, regional 
and household level. First, at a macro level (depending on the relative size of remittances with 
respect to the rest of the economy), remittances are believed to reinforce the national balance of 
payments by provision of foreign exchange, but, at the same time, they can deteriorate the balance 
of trade by inducing imports and the appreciation of national currency. Second, at a regional level, 
remittance inflows could boost up the local economy and finance development projects, but they 
can also widen inequality gaps between poor families and ignite inflation. Finally, in household 
terms, remittances can relax family budget constraints allowing them to meet basic needs as 
consumption, health and even education. Unfortunately, they are rarely used for productive 
investment and could create “dependency” inducing receivers to neglect local productive activities. 
 
To round up the picture, migration is re-shaping the economic interactions between Mexico and the 
United States. According to the Pew Hispanic Center2, in 2005 the undocumented population in the 
United States reached about 11 million, from which about 60 percent were Mexicans. This is a huge 
mass of people operating at the margins of informality in both countries. If on top we add 
remittances sent through informal channels, we cannot neglect the effects that the informal sector is 
having on the Mexican economic growth. Hence, our decision to develop a simple endogenous 
growth model able to capture both positive and negative impacts of the previous flows, having in 
mind the Mexican scenario and characteristics. 
 
                                                 
1 In the last century, remittances and illegal migration have experienced a striking increase. According to the 
Economist, (January 5th-11th 2008) –Special Report on Migration--), remittances from the U.S. to Europe in 1907   
accounted for only $6.2 billion US dollars, while in 2007 we are in the range of $240-300 billion US dollars, both in 
real terms. 
 
2 Pew Hispanic Center  (2005) “Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population”, 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=44 
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In the following two sections we will provide a brief overview of the main variables of interest of 
this paper (i.e. informality, remittances and migration). The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. First, we present a simple theoretical model that examines the possible channels through 
which increases of informality could affect the Mexican economy. Next, we run some simulations 
using stylized facts and parameters obtained from our previous empirical exercises. Finally, we 
conclude and present some possible policy implications. 
 
 
 
B. Informality 
 
In this work, for simplicity reasons, we define informality3 as the share of the aggregate labor force 
that is totally unregulated (e.g. second unregistered jobs, unskilled workers without social security, 
clandestine immigrants not allowed to work in a foreign country, etc.). Theoretically informality is 
believed to affect the economy through negative externalities in rich countries, and it is widely 
believed that in a sense has moderate positive effects on poor and developing countries.  
 
On one hand, informality through its activities creates a vicious cycle on tax revenue. Indeed, it 
deprives or drains resources from the government, since informal agents use to some extent public 
goods and services, generate income, but do not pay taxes. As a consequence, the central 
government is forced to rise taxes on the formal sector, hence putting more pressure on formal 
agents, giving them incentives to switch to informality. Furthermore, informality is believed to 
distort official prices and wages, adding noise to formal markets. On the other hand, the informal 
sector is the only way through which many people can have access to sources of income, especially 
in poor countries (see IADB 2006). 
 
One of the first attempts to model the informal sector was done by Loayza (1997), who used an 
extension of an AK model with two types of production functions, one for each sector (formal-
informal). In his model, the size of the informal sector is conditioned mainly by the tax rates, the 
strength of the enforcement system (i. e. police, legal system, etc.) and the productivity of public 
services relative to private services. This reasoning is at the base of many empirical studies that 
focus on taxes and corruption as the main variables explaining the existence of informality. 
 
As we already discussed, measuring the size of informality represents a total challenge in the 
economic literature due to the lack of official records to which we could refer. Having this in mind, 
the literature offers a great variety of methods that we can group and summarize as follows. 
 
First of all, we have the Direct Methods4. Usually these methods rely on voluntary anonymous 
surveys, collected by private or public institutions, and are subject to the usual drawbacks (politics, 
human errors, the willingness to cooperate, etc.).  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Surveys regarding the informal sector are usually done by public institutions. In the Mexican case, INEGI, the 
National Statistics Institute, is in charge of such endeavour. 
 
4 The most common of the indirect methods is the currency demand approach. The interested reader can refer to Tanzi 
(1983), Ahumada et al. (2006) and Bovi (1999). 
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Second, we have the very popular Indirect Methods5. Here, researchers rely on discrepancies 
between different indicators to proxy the true size of the informal sector (i.e differences between 
official and actual labour force, differences between national expenditure and income statistics, and 
the famous “Currency Demand Approach”).  
 
The last method is known as the Model Approach, and uses structural equations to model 
informality as a latent variable in order to capture its evolution through time. This method is also 
known as the MIMIC method (multiple indicators, multiple causes method). Although not new to 
the literature, the MIMIC model was popularized recently by Schneider (2002) who used it to 
estimate the size of the informal economy in 110 countries around the world. 
 
 
 
 
C. Remittances and Migration  
 
The other two variables of interest in this work are remittances and migration. In the past, the 
literature has dealt with migration inside a country (from the countryside to cities) and the possible 
interactions that these flows could have with growth and unemployment. The seminal work done on 
this subject can be tracked back to Harris and Todaro (1970) and Robertson and Wellisz (1977). 
 
 Nowadays, the scale of these flows is bigger in magnitude and broader in range than in the past. 
Indeed, we are witnessing massive migration flows to the developed countries of the world. 
Migration can be legal or illegal, temporary or permanent, skilled or unskilled and, in the same way 
as the informal sector, its relationship with growth is not clear.  
 
In Figure 1 we can see the magnitude of 
Mexican migrant outflows over the past 30 
years. It is important to point out that this figure 
refers to official or tractable migration, so it 
does not include illegal migration. Nevertheless, 
the figure is impressive, and according to the 
World Bank, Mexico experienced an outflow of 
near 4 million persons between 2000 and 2005. 
The majority of these outflows are directed to 
the U.S. 
Figure 1.                      Net Migration 
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Source: The Wolrd Bank’s World Development Indicators. Note: Vertical axis 
measures the number of persons that migrate from the source country. 
 
On the other hand and closely linked to migration we have remittances. Flows of remittances have 
been growing steadily in the past decades and have surpassed foreign assistance and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in some cases6.  Furthermore, remittances appear to be cyclically stable compared 
to other capital flows, see Maimbo and Ratha (2005), and Kapur (2005). Once more, their impact on 
growth is not completely clear, although they have become vital for some countries, in particular in 
some Central American, reaching an astonishing amount of 22.5 percent of GDP (see Figure 2). 
Empirical researchers use “recorded remittances” as a proxy, but the actual amount and the 
channels used to send the money are also affected by the shadows of informality. Indeed, the World 
Bank (2006) estimates that adding informal transfers will increase the official figure by 
                                                 
5 Although simple versions of the model can be estimated using standard econometrics software, most practitioners use 
specialized packages as LISREL and AMOS. 
 
6 See World Bank (2006) and for the Mexican case refer to Lopez-Cordova (2006). 
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approximately 50 percent in some countries. 
 
Figure 2.                                                Remittances to major receiving countries 
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Source: OECD Factbook 2007b. Note: Remittances are in percentage of GDP, 2005. The data may exclude amounts  
Transferred  that are less than a particular threshold value. Remittances transferred by informal methods or brought  
                                              back by migrants in their pockets are not counted. 
 
McCormick and Wahba (2000) study in a broader perspective the effects of remittances and 
overseas employment, analyzing the possible effects of population growth and family altruism 
(remittances), finding that remittances affect substantially the domestic expenditure and real 
exchange rates.   
 
Figure 3a.  Foreign Direct Investment vs. Remittances 
in Latin America 
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Source: World Bank’s WDI. Note: Vertical Axis in millions of US dollars. 
Figures 3a and 3b show the evolution of 
remittances and FDI during the past three 
decades in the Latin American Region, and in 
particular in Mexico. As we can see, remittances 
inflows have grown steadily and constantly until 
they became an essential source of income for 
many poor families in the region. According to 
the Mexican Central Bank statistics, on 
average, Mexican recipients of remittances get 
circa $340 US dollars every month from their 
relatives abroad.  
 
This amount is not only superior to what an 
unskilled worker would make in a formal job in 
Mexico (32 million Mexicans, about 75 percent 
of the Economic Active Population receive a 
salary in the range of 47 to 235 daily pesos, 
which is equivalent to $4 or $20 US dollars per 
day), but is also fairly stable over time and 
immune to national shocks. Actually, 
according to Chami et al. (2008) among others, 
the stability of remittances provides additional 
macroeconomic benefits by helping  to reduce 
volatility of output and consumption in 
developing countries. This is one of the main 
Figure 3b. Foreign Direct Investment vs. Remittances 
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reasons propelling part of the existing literature that attributes to remittances the power of reducing 
poverty by helping agents to insure their consumption against negative shocks, helping enhance 
physical and human capital, as well as, alleviating credit constraints.   
 
According to a recent study by the International Fund for Agricultural Development-IFAD (2007), 
remittances flows have been “hidden in plain view” for many years, although for many poor 
families around the world these flows represent the only helping hand capable or willing to lift them 
out of poverty, since the majority of  them are used to cover basic needs (e.g. food, clothing, and 
housing). 
 
Hence, many regional governments in Latin American countries and around the world have 
implemented economic policies oriented to enhance or attract these flows. However, relying only 
on remittances to fight poverty and improve macro stability could be risky if governments do not 
take the appropriate measures to ensure that these transfers enter the economic system as productive 
investment rather than only spurious consumption. Remittances are exposed to political shocks in 
the host countries (the tightening of migration laws) that could close or disrupt the inflows, heating 
severely the economies of many countries. 
 
 
 
D. A Simple Model. 
 
In a globalized world with free trade agreements in all continents, it becomes imperative to uncover 
the behaviour of informality and its reaction to new markets. Figure 4 diagrams the intuition behind 
our model. It presents possible channels that could lead to interactions between informality in 
different countries. 
 
Figure 4.     Informality, migration and remittance interactions 
 
Informality 
Country A 
Remittances
Illegal 
Migration  Informality 
Country B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country A (Foreign/Host) is capital intensive and belongs to the rich/developed economies, while 
country B (Home/Source) is labour intensive and forms part of the poor/developing economies. In 
autarky, country A and B have reached equilibrium on the size of their respective informal sectors. 
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The causes that gave origin to informality in each country can be different but we can assume that 
internal deficiencies like high taxes, bad institutional quality and adverse regulations are the main 
factors that propelled the underground economy in each country. 
 
Now, when we open the economy of country A and B, we will find that country A has demand for 
unskilled labour which country B is willing to provide either in the formal or informal sector in 
country A. If regulations obstruct this flow, but demand remains unchanged, a market for illegal 
workers will enter the equation, increasing informality in country A. Foreign unskilled workers 
(legal or illegal) in country A will receive a wage. These workers will send back part of their salary 
in the form of remittances to their families at their home country B. The extra money could be used 
in country B to maintain or increase consumption, and also to finance the formal sector. But if the 
conditions that created informality in country B have not improved in the time being, this new 
income flows could also be used in the informal sector, explaining its increase also in country B. 
 
In order to analyse some possible channels through which the existence of informality in one 
country could affect growth and informality in other countries, below we present a simple 
theoretical model. We will not deal with the causes of informality, we will assume that it exists and 
focus on its interactions. First of all, we will choose a type of production function that uses both 
formal and informal labor, allowing them to coexist in our economy.   
 
Furthermore, the model will attempt to pin down some stylized facts uncovered by previous 
empirical studies dealing with the informal sector and remittances in the Mexican economy (see,    
e.g. Chapters one and two). 
 
In our analysis we include the informal sector in our model focusing mainly on the labor force 
(usually research dealing with migration and remittances has focused mainly on a branch of the 
economic literature known as the “brain drain” in open economy models7 ). Thus, the production 
function for final output in our economy is given by: 
 
αψψα −−= 11 )( SFAKY ,    0 < α < 1,  0<ψ<1                                                   (1) 
 
where A is the usual exogenous technology parameter, K is the capital variable, and aggregate 
labor8 is formed by formal labor (F) and informal labor (S). Furthermore, in our model the share of 
labor ψ allocated to the formal sector is country specific. 
 
Given that in the Mexican economy the migration flows interest mainly the informal and unskilled 
sectors, in this model we will allow only the informal workers to migrate9. So, in this context, both 
the formal and informal sectors grow at a different pace. On one hand, the formal workers 
exogenous growth rate will be given by x ≥ 0, while on the other hand, informal workers natural 
                                                 
7 We direct interested readers on the previous treatment of the brain drain effects on source and host countries to works  
by Beine et al.  (2001) and  Saint-Paul G. (2004), while readers interested in the effects of migration and related 
variables on economic growth can refer to Larramona and Sanso (2006), Mountford  (1997) , Rebelo  (1991) and 
Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti (1994)  for a thorough treatment. 
 
8 The aggregate labor function is  . ψψ −= 1SFL
 
9 The assumption of international immobility of one sector has been used mainly in brain drain studies. We refer interest 
readers to Pieretti and Zou (2006, 2007) for a complete treatment of aggregate labor using a CES function relating the 
skilled and unskilled sector. 
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growth rate j ≥ 0 has to be adjusted by the migration flows10 (γ), so that the final informal sector 
labor growth rate is defined as h = j-γ.  
 
Due to the fact that in our model intra-labor substitutability is unitary, it follows that the aggregate 
growth rate of labor can be defined as follows: 
 
n = xψ + h(1-ψ),      x ≥ h                                                            (2) 
 
A part of the informal workers that migrate (i.e Mexican “wetbacks / braceros” crossing the border 
to the U.S.) send back a part of the money that  they make in the foreign country as remittances to 
their families in the source country. 
 
Formally, we define remittances as follows: 
 
REM = ν·Wforeign ·I ,                    0 ≤ ν≤ 1                                (3) 
 
where REM corresponds to a fix portion ν of the foreign wage times the number of (Mexican ) 
migrants I. 
 
Translating this into home country terms we get:  
 
REM = ν·(1+z)·WS·φ·S ,              z>0, and   0< φ<1                       (4) 
 
In order to ensure enough incentives for migration, foreign wages are assumed to be higher than 
home informal wages (WS) in a fix proportion11 (1+z), while the total number of migrants I 
corresponds to a fraction φ of total informal sector workers (S). 
 
Therefore, informal and formal wages in this economy are defined respectively as follows: 
 
 
S
YWS
)1)(1( ψα −−=                                                                      (5) 
and 
 
 
F
YWF
))(1( ψα−=                                                                         (6) 
 
Hence, the economy’s resource constraint in the home country takes into account a significant cash 
flow in the form of remittances: 
 
REMCKSFAKK +−∂−= −−• αψψα 11 )(                                                    (7) 
                                                 
10 We define the proportion of informal I sector migrants to the total informal sector workers as γ = I / S. 
 
11 According to the Fair Labor Standards Act,  in the United States, the Federal minimum wage in 2007 was set to 
$5.85 US dollars per hour, although many states and regions within the American Union have higher wages. On the 
other hand, Mexican minimum wages account to only $47 MX Pesos on a daily basis. Just to give the reader an idea of 
the huge wage gap between the two countries, the Mexican salary is equivalent to $0.54 US Dollars per hour, so in 
proportion the American minimum wages are 10 times higher than in Mexico.   
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It is important to point out that remittances12 could enter the constraint with a negative sign if we 
were in the host country, since the latter correspond to outflows going from the host country to the 
source country (USA →Mexico), draining resources from the host’s budget constraint.  
 
Agents in our economy maximize the value of the discounted felicity function subject to the budget 
constraint. Formally, in our case the dynamic problem reads as follows13: 
 
 
0
0
1
)0(
..
1
1max
kk
remcnkkykts
dteec ntt
c
=
+−−−=
−
−
•
−∞
−∫
δ
σ
ρ
σ
                                                              (8) 
 
where we are assuming that the instantaneous felicity function has a constant intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution σ
1 ,  ρ represents the constant rate of time preference and n is population 
growth. 
 
Setting up the Hamiltonian of the above dynamic problem we get: 
 
 
)(
1
1 )(1 remcnkkyecH tn +−−−+−
−= −
−
δλσ
ρ
σ
                                                 (9)   
 
 
Using the Keynes-Ramsey rule of optimal consumption and  the first order conditions we can obtain 
the following dynamic system: 
 
 
 
)))))1()1)(1(1((( 1 ρδψνϕαασ
α −−−−−++= −• nzAkcc                                        (10) 
 
cnkzAkk −+−−−++=• )())1()1)(1(1( δψνϕαα                                             (11) 
 
 
cckk ~)(;)0( 0 =∞=                                                                (12) 
 
 
                                                 
12 In our model remittances will increase with the pool of  informal workers available for migration. 
 
)1()1)(1(* ψνϕα −−+= zyrem , where ψψ −= 1SF
Yy . 
13 The functions were rewritten using the intensive form, where ψψ −= 1SF
Kk . 
 
 10
Next, we proceed to study the transitional dynamics of our model by linearizing our dynamic 
system around the steady state )~,~( kc  using the first-order Taylor approximation: 
 
 
)~()~(~)~( kkbccacc −+−=−•                                                               (13) 
 
 
)~()~(~)~( kkfccdkk −+−=−
•
                                                             (14) 
 
 
 
where  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
fd
ba
  = ∆ = 
 
 
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−−−−++−
+−−+−−−−+−−+
=
−−
−−
δψανϕαα σ
ψνϕααα
σ
ρδψνϕαα
αα
αα
nkzAkA
zAcknzAk
11
21
)1()1)(1(1
)1)1()1)(1(()1()1)1()1)(1((
   
 
 
Consequently, defining ∆  as the coefficients matrix, and |∆| as its determinant, we can see that the 
trace of our matrix tr (∆) > 0, and the determinant |∆| < 0. So, this allows us to infer that our 
characteristic roots are real and of opposite sign, which confirms that we have a saddle-point 
stability14. 
 
Computing the linearized system for the steady state we get the following solutions: 
 
 
 
α
α
α
ρδ
ψνϕααψνϕα
δρδ
ψνϕαα
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
−−++−−+++
+
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
−−++=
1
1
1
))1()1)(1(1())1()1)(1(1(
)())1()1)(1(1(ˆ
n
zAzA
n
n
zAc
               (15) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The complete derivation and numerical analysis is provided in the Appendix. 
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αρδ
ψνϕαα −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
−−++= 1
1
))1()1)(1(1(ˆ
n
zAk                                            (16) 
 
 
 
From our model we can appreciate that besides the usual positive effects from technology and 
capital intensity, increases in the informal sector could have an overall enhancing effect on 
economic growth due to positive cash inflows that the economy gets through remittances.  
 
This possible positive effect depends mainly on the size of the wage gap between the host and the 
source country15, as well as on size of the portion of foreign wage that the illegal foreign worker is 
willing or able to send back to his family in the source country.  
 
If the wage gap is big enough to offset the drain of informal labor force in the source economy then 
increases in the informal sector could improve, at least in the short-run, economic growth. 
 
To clarify this point in the next section we proceed to run some simulations using benchmark 
parameters from previous empirical studies (for more see the Appendix). 
 
 
 
E. Simulation 
 
In this section, we perform a numerical exercise. The parameters used for the simulations of the 
benchmark model are reported in Table 1 in the Appendix.  
 
First, we use the equations in the linearized system (13) and (14) in order to compute the 
eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of our model, which are reported in the table below: 
 
Table 1. 
 
 1 2 
Eigenvalues 0.121023 -0.081023 
Eigenvectors         c        0.080758 
        k      -0.996734 
-0.120147 
-0.992756 
 
 
Second, we proceed to compute the solutions of the linearized system and run simulations of the 
adjustment processes.  
 
Using the above eigenvectors and eigenvalues we can express the linearized system as follows: 
 
 
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+−+−++−−++−= −− αρδ
ψνϕααδ 1
1
121023.0
1
0810233.0
2
))1()1)(1(1()(0807587.0120147.0)(
n
zAneBeBtc tt  
 
                                                 
15 The U.S. minimum wage is about 10 times higher than the Mexican one in current terms. 
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α
α
ρδ
ψνϕααψνϕα −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+−+−+++−+−+++ 1))1()1)(1(1())1()1)(1(1(
n
zAzA                           (17) 
 
 
 
α
ρδ
ψνϕαα −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+−+−++++−= 1
1
121023.0
1
0810233.0
2
))1()1)(1(1(
996734.0992756.0)(
n
zAeBeBtk tt                  (18) 
 
 
In order to determine our arbitrary constants of integration B1 and B2, we evaluate the solutions of  
our linearized system at t = 016. Furthermore, we set B1= 0 and solve for c(0) and B2. 
Finally, we need to assign a set of initial and final parameters in order to graph the adjustment  
process of our final solutions. 
 
Solutions 
                          Figure 5a                       Figure 5b 
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                        10 20 30 40 50 60 t
13
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k
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: Horizontal axis represents time, while vertical axis measure consumption and capital respectively. 
 
 
Once we got the solutions, we plot the results. Figure 5a represents the adjustment process for 
consumption, while Figure 5b describes capital over time. 
 
As anticipated in the previous section, we now proceed to simulate increases in the informal sector 
in order to exemplify its possible impacts on economic growth. Figure 6 is divided in three panels: 
A, B and C. Panel A depicts the different effects on capital, panel B does the same for consumption, 
while panel C summarizes the several solution trajectories as well as the isoclines in the (k , c) 
space. 
 
Column 1 represents the benchmark model, where the share of informality in the economy (1-ψ) is 
set to be 30 percent, while the wage differential (1+z) is fixed at 5 and illegal migrants are assumed 
to send back a preset portion ν of their foreign wages in the form of remittances amounting to 1/2 of 
their total payment. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 cBBc ~)0( 122111 ++= µµ  
kBBk ~)0( 222211 ++= µµ  
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Starting from the benchmark model in Column 1, we augment the share of informal labor from 30 
percent to 50 percent. This increase, helped by the wage differential, will have an overall positive 
impact on the economy clearly visible in Column 2. From Panel C we can appreciate that the 
isocline moves rightward from 7.6 to 8.4 over the capital axis (k), while isocline 
increases, being intercepted by the solution trajectory at 1.7 on the consumption axis (c). 
Nevertheless, the positive effect vanishes once the wage gap decreases significantly. Ceteris 
paribus, if we cut down the wage differential (1+ z) from 5 to 0.01, the magnitude of the 
remittances inflows to the source country are not enough to offset the loss of aggregate labor, 
subtracting resources to the economy and therefore reducing growth. Column 3 diagrams these 
draining effects. From Panel C we can see how the isocline  
0ˆ =c
0ˆ =k
0ˆ =c  decreases from 8.4 to 6.9 once 
we reduce drastically the wage gap. 
 
Finally, on Column 4, we simulate a total interruption of remittances by setting ν equal to zero, and 
compare the effects to the benchmark model. As expected, blocking remittances inflows will impact 
directly the budget constraint of our economy. So, from Panel C, we can observe a significant 
decrease of almost 1 point on the horizontal axis, settling at 6.5 units. 
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Figure 6. Dynamic Simulations 
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Panel 
B 
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Panel 
C 
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Parameters ν=0.5; ψ=0.7; z=4.0 ν=0.5; ψ=0.5; z=4.0 ν=0.5; ψ=0.5; z=0.01 ν=0.0; ψ=0.7; z=4.0 
 
Note: Panel A and B plot the time paths of capital k(t) and consumption c(t), while Panel C plots the isoclines with the different solution trajectories (bold line) in the (k, c) space. 
Column 1 depicts the benchmark model simulation and columns 2 to 4 show the variations due to changes in the informal sector parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous simulations show the impact of alternative values for the share of informal labour and 
the channels through which they can affect differently and indirectly the source economy, in this 
case Mexico. Increases in the remittances flows are shown to enhance the Mexican resource 
constraint as long as the wage differential is high enough to offset the constant loss of labor force. 
 
 
 
F. Conclusions 
 
In order to analyse the possible channels through which informality, remittances and migration 
could interact and consequently affect economic growth in Mexico, we develop a simple 
endogenous growth model that allows for remittances and the coexistence of the formal and 
informal sector in the production function. 
 
In the Mexican case, assuming that only informal workers are willing to migrate and defining 
remittances as income transfers, we impose limitations to our model in such a way that, at the end, 
growth rates in our economy depend on the size of the informal sector in Mexico and on the wage 
differential with the United States. Furthermore, we simulate a possible disruption of remittance 
flows, and analyze the detrimental effects that this could have on the Mexican economy. Our model 
shows that remittances play a crucial role on enhancing the Mexican resource constraint, while the 
possibility of migration in the informal sector drains the aggregate labor force. However, the 
magnitude of potential remittances may offset this loss, thus having an overall positive effect on 
economic growth. 
 
This is just half of the picture of the many possible interactions that may take place in the globalized 
economies of our days, and is certainly not exhaustive of the many channels through which 
informality, remittances and migration can affect growth in a country. Nevertheless, our model 
sheds some light on the fact that these macroeconomic variables can have different and sometimes 
contrasting effects in neighbouring economies, like Mexico and the U.S.  
 
Our model can also provide some interesting policy implications. On one hand, it is clear that 
remittances represent a major and constant flow of very much needed income in poor segments of 
society. So, facilitating and improving these flows is vital to help fighting poverty and fostering 
economic growth. Governments should take measures to incentive senders to use formal channels 
and, at the same time, give the receivers the opportunity to use a share of their money to invest in 
the productive sectors of the economy through the development of special financial services. Doing 
so will allow governments to benefit indirectly from these flows by taxing a small portion of 
remittances and at the same time will enhance the economy in case of a sudden disruption of 
remittances. 
 
From an empirical perspective, it would be interesting to conduct an empirical test of our model to 
validate our theory. However, as we explained in the introduction, the variables of interest are per 
se difficult to measure. Indeed, time series recording remittances and at some extent illegal 
immigration are available in different databases, but the availability and reliability of data related to 
informality are still scarce. Therefore, researchers may be forced to use alternative methods of 
estimation that might limit the strength of the empirical conclusions. 
 
Finally, for future research, we believe it could be worth to relax the assumptions of our model, 
allowing for taxation, introducing frictions for migration, and enabling workers in both the formal 
and informal sector to migrate.   
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Appendix Chapter III 
 
 
Table 2.                   Simulation Parameters for the Benchmark Model 
 
 
Note: We tried to fix parameters the closest possible to observed empirical data and stylized facts 
within the Mexican economy. 
 
 
Capital Share 
 
Using previous empirical studies (see Loayza et 
al. 2005) we setup the benchmark capital share 
for the Mexican economy at α = 0.3 
 
Population Growth Rate 
 
We set n = 0.02, this corresponds to the average 
population growth rate in the past three decades. 
1970-2006. 
Proportion of foreign wages sent as 
remittances 
 
The proportion of foreign wages sent as 
remittances is difficult to asses. Using data from 
the Mexican Central Bank and previous works  
by Pieretti and Zou (2006, 2007) we decided to 
set the quantity of repatriation of foreign wages 
at ν = 0.5 
 
Technology Parameter 
 
For the sake of simplicity we set the technology 
parameter A=1.0 
Wage differential 
 
The minimum wage differential in current terms 
between the U.S. and Mexico is high, workers 
in the U.S. can earn 10 times what the same 
worker can make in Mexico; however, in order 
to take into account inflation and other local 
factors we decided to set it at z = 4.0 
 
Size of the informal sector 
 
According to the estimates of the first two 
chapters of this dissertation and INEGI, the 
percentage of informal workers could be set at 
(1-ψ) = 0.3.  
Discount Factor 
 
We set the discount factor at δ=0.02 
 
Migration 
 
Using the World Bank’s WDI database we try 
to approximate the magnitude of migration 
flows, setting it at  φ=0.2 
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Saddle-Point Equilibrium 
 
 
 
In order to confirm that we have a saddle-point equilibrium, we need to check the signs of the  
 
eigenvalues of our system of two differential equations after it has been linearized around the  
 
steady-state point. 
 
The coefficient matrix of the linearized system is: 
 
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−−−−++−
+−−+−−−−+−−+
−−
−−
δψανϕαα σ
ψνϕααα
σ
ρδψνϕαα
αα
αα
nkzAkA
zAcknzAk
11
21
)1()1)(1(1
)1)1()1)(1(()1()1)1()1)(1((
 
 
 
which has determinant 
 
[  ))1()1)(1()()1)1()1)(1((( 111 δψανϕααρδψνϕαα ααα −−−−++−−−+−−+ −−− nkzAkAnzAk
+ 
))1)1()1)(1(()1(( 2 +−−+−− ψνϕαααα zAck ] < 0 , 
 
Now, using the benchmark parameters (see Table 2), we have that the determinant is -0.0126933 < 
0, while the trace of our matrix is given by 
 
  ))1()1)(1(())1)1()1)(1((( 111 δψανϕααρδψνϕαα ααα −−−−+++−−−+−−+ −−− nkzAkAnzAk
 
and, again using the benchmark parameters, we get that our trace is 0.04 > 0, ensuring that indeed  
 
we have a saddle-point equilibrium. 
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